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Child Labor, Schooling, and Poverty in Latin America 
Guilherme Sedlacek, Suzanne Duryea, Nadeem Ilahi and Masaru Sasaki 
 
One of the challenges in designing policies to combat child labor is the puzzling 
finding from Chapter 1 that as economic growth progresses, the pace of reductions in child 
labor appears to slow down.  Consequently, policies that raise per capita income may not, by 
themselves, lower the incidence of child labor.  If they do lower child labor, the reductions 
may only occur over a period of decades.  This appears to be the current challenge to 
reducing child labor in Latin America, where per capita income is now high enough that 
child labor has become relatively insensitive to further income gains. 
Many countries have policies restricting child labor in the belief that reducing child 
labor is complementary with a policy goal of increasing educational attainment.  Two issues 
regarding the relationship between child labor and education warrant a policymaker's 
attention.  First, research establishing the nature of the relationship between child labor and 
education is surprisingly limited.  For instance, it is not clear whether child labor discourages 
school attendance or if it only lowers the quality of school attainment.  This distinction is not 
trivial because the policy tools aimed at increasing enrollment are different from those aimed 
at raising the productivity of time spent in school.  This issue is particularly relevant in Latin 
America where most working children are enrolled in school.  Previous research has not 
established whether a child’s time in work adversely affects the productivity of his or her 
time in school. Second, child labor and its effect on education do not operate in a vacuum.  
Both are outcomes of complex household-level decisions.  Both child labor and education are 
intimately related to other factors affecting households, including the number of children in 
the household, the household's access to income, and the parents' interest in schooling.  Once 
further improvement in child labor has become insensitive to overall economic growth, 
policies will need to alter incentives to send children to work.  It is therefore important that 
an analysis that explores the association between child labor and education incorporate these 
household-level factors. 
This chapter shows that in Latin America, child labor does have a negative and 
significant effect on educational enrollment.  However, it has an even larger adverse effect on 2 
the pace of progression through school and the quality of attainment through attendance.  
These results are stronger for the poor.  Thus, targeted conditional cash transfer programs for 
human development, such as PROGRESA (now Oportunidades) and Bolsa Escola, are 
correct in requiring that beneficiary children actually attend school rather than concentrating 
on school enrollment. 
Stylized Facts on Child Labor and Schooling in Latin America 
Employment rates for eighteen Latin American countries for children aged 10 to 14 
are shown in figure 1.  The data are taken from the most recently available surveys: 2000 for 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay; 1999 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Honduras, and Venezuela; and 1998 for the rest of the countries.  Child 
employment rates range widely from 1% in Chile to 36% in Ecuador.  The average is 12.5% 
across all eighteen countries, roughly equal to the worldwide child labor participation rate.  
Whereas employment rates in Chile and Argentina are among the lowest rates of all 
developing countries, employment rates in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are among the highest. 
Figure 1 also reports that 90% of the children aged 10 to 14 in the eighteen countries 
are enrolled in school.  There is an apparent inverse relationship between school enrollment 
and child labor.  Of the nine countries with above-average child employment rates, six have 
below-average enrollment rates.  The simple cross-sectional correlation between enrollment 
and employment rates is -0.4.  The relationship is hardly definitive.  Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru 
have above-average enrollment rates despite having above-average child employment rates.  
In fact, across these countries, 63% of the children aged 10 to 14 reported as working also are 
reported as being enrolled in school. 
While one of the potential consequences of early entry into the labor market is that 
the child's education will be cut short, past empirical evidence of child labor's impact on 
education is mixed.  Child labor actually may enhance educational opportunities by raising 
household income and thus the ability to afford education.  As Ravallion and Wodon (2001) 
argue, working and schooling are not mutually exclusive for children.  Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos (1997) found evidence suggesting that child labor and enrollment were 
complementary activities.  While in all eighteen countries, enrollment rates for working 
children are lower than for children who are not working, it is clear that working and 3 
schooling are not mutually exclusive.  This presents one of the challenges for our analysis 
that follows:  if child labor does not remove children from school, does it actually lower the 
human capital production of poor children?  If it does not, then policies that limit 
opportunities for child labor are almost certainly counterproductive.   
Not only is there a wide distribution of child employment rates across these countries, 
but there also is a wide variety of time paths of employment rates.  Figure 2 reports the trends 
in employment rates for 10- to 14-year-olds in seven Latin American countries for which 
time series information could be obtained.  Labor force participation rates in Honduras and 
Venezuela rose over the last decade. In Mexico, child labor initially rose from 6% to 9% but 
has fallen since 1998.  Child labor in Uruguay has remained stable at around 1% to 2% from 
1981 to 2000.  Meanwhile, child labor has been falling in Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica.  
The diversity of experiences represents another challenge for researchers to explain the 
variation in success in combating child labor.  The timing of improvements in child labor 
rates in Brazil and Mexico corresponds roughly to the installation of government policies to 
combat child labor, suggesting that government intervention may provide an effective avenue 
for addressing the problem.
1  
Figure 3 illustrates an indication of one source of variation in schooling investments 
across Latin American countries.  Enrollment rates are traced for different ages and income 
groups.  Enrollment rates peak at 10 years and then begin to drop off.  The pattern occurs 
even in the wealthier households, but is particularly pronounced for poor children.  Children 
in the poorest income groups in Latin America are slow to enter school and quick to exit.  
Enrollment rates in the wealthiest families are more than 90% for children aged 6 to 15.  For  
                                                 
1 The timing of the decline in child labor rates corresponds to implementation of PROGRESA, a targeted 
transfer program designed to combat child labor.  See the chapter by Skoufias and Parker for a detailed 
evaluation of the PROGRESA program.   Similarly, decreases in child labor rates after 1994 in Brazil 
correspond to the initiation of the Bolsa Escola and PETI programs evaluated later in the book. 4 
the poorest children, enrollment rates do not rise above 90% until age 8, and fall below 90% 
again by age 12.  While the enrollment gap across income groups is only a few percentage 
points for children aged 8 to 11, about 15% of the poorest children already have spent one or 
two fewer years in school by age 8 than children in the wealthiest households.  In addition, 
those poorest children begin to drop out of school in large numbers after age 11.  For children 
aged 14 to 16, the difference in enrollment rates between rich and poor grows from 20 to 34 
percentage points.  Consequently, the small differences in enrollment rates across income 
groups for 8- to 11-year- olds masks large differences in past and future acquisitions of 
human capital between income groups.  This suggests that enrollment rates may yield 
misleading information on the extent of the differences in human capital investment in the 
children of the poor and the wealthy. 
Across Latin American countries, the simple correlation between levels of per capita 
income and child labor is -0.44.  Worldwide, this is roughly half the correlation between the 
two factors, which indicates that Latin American countries are positioned in the flat region of 
the tradeoff between income and child labor described in chapter 1.  It also is comparable to 
the correlation between child labor and school enrollment in Latin America.   Consequently, 
policies to combat child labor in Latin America may not be very effective if they rely on 
raising income or school enrollment alone.  The chance of success is enhanced if the policy 
aims to raise income and increase time in school.  
Detailed Descriptive Data on Child Labor and Schooling 
Four Latin American countries have conducted recent household surveys that allow a 
much more detailed investigation of the determinants of child labor and schooling.  The data 
sets include the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) of Ecuador (1995), 
Nicaragua (1998), and Peru (1997), as well as the 1996 edition of the Brazilian national 
household survey (PNAD).  All LSMS surveys follow a similar design, so there is a high 
degree of data comparability across surveys.  Comparisons with Brazil need to be made more 
carefully because the wording of the questions may differ from that of the other countries.  
Nevertheless, the key questions on child labor force participation and child time in school are 
similar across all four surveys. 5 
These four countries are broadly representative of the region.  Brazil is in the upper 
middle-income category.  There, child labor has been declining but it remains high for an 
upper middle-income country.
2  Peru and Ecuador represent the majority of the countries in 
the region, i.e., those in the lower middle-income category.  Both of these countries have 
relatively high levels of child labor.  Nicaragua represents the low-income countries, but has 
child employment rates at the median of the countries in the region. 
The incidence of child labor force participation for children aged 10 to 14 by country, 
urban-rural residence, and gender is reported in table 1.
3  The patterns are similar across all 
four countries.  Child labor is more common in rural than in urban areas.  Rural child labor 
participation rates are four times higher than urban rates in Brazil and Peru, 2.7 times higher 
in Nicaragua, and 1.6 times higher in Ecuador.  Boys are more likely than girls to work in all 
four countries.  While some of this difference may be because girls may be more likely to 
perform household chores without pay, perhaps the more important point is that girls' 
employment rates are high in their own right.  Consequently, child labor is not just an issue 
for young boys, but for young girls, as well. 
Child labor is viewed as a problem in part because it is seen as limiting the human 
capital and, ultimately, the earning potential of children.  Table 2 relates how child labor 
interacts with child enrollment rates.  Child labor rates range from 11% in Nicaragua to 36% 
in Ecuador; however, the two countries have identical enrollment rates.  Of these four 
countries, Peru has the highest enrollment rates, even though 29% of Peruvian children are 
working.  Although working children in all these countries are 5 to 29 percentage points less 
likely to be in school than their nonworking counterparts, clearly, child labor and education 
can coexist. 
However, working children may not perform as well in school.  The more children 
have to work, the more tired they will be when in school and the less time they will have for  
                                                 
2  The classification of countries into low, lower-middle and upper-middle are based on 1997 GNP per capita 
figures reported in the World Development Report 1998-99. 
3 In table 1, the incidence of child labor is higher than the ILO estimates used in chapter 1.  The difference is 
that the ILO only reports full-time work, while the survey data reports full- and part-time work. 6 
study.  Consequently, work may have an adverse effect on learning while in school, even if it 
does not have a large effect on enrollment.
4  The distribution of hours worked per day for 
children aged 10 to 14, shown in table 3, suggests that a high proportion of working children 
work too many hours to be successful in school.  More than half the working children in 
Nicaragua work over five hours per day, as do just under half of the working children in 
Brazil.  The proportions in Ecuador (34%) and Peru (15%) are modest in comparison, but 
still high enough to suggest a problem. 
A later chapter will quantify the impact of child labor on student learning as indicated 
by student performance on achievement tests.  This chapter uses a less direct indicator—
whether the child's years of completed education is at the level expected for the child's age.  
If child labor limits the amount of time a child can devote to study, working children would 
be expected to fail in greater proportions than would students whose attention is not divided 
between work and school. 
As shown in table 4, it is common for children in Latin America to lag behind in 
school.  The percentages vary from 31% in Peru to 56% in Ecuador.
5  Girls are more likely to 
be promoted than boys, but even so, 30% or more of the girls are behind their age-
appropriate grade level.  
A high proportion of children who are not working are behind grade level; children 
who are working while attending school are even further behind.  With the exception of 
Ecuador, children who are only working are even further behind, so it appears that enrolled 
children who work are still making academic progress.  However, that progress is markedly 
slower than that of children who are not working.  This suggests that even if school and work 
are not mutually exclusive activities, working children will complete fewer years of 
schooling than will children who do not work.
6  Estimates of returns per year of schooling 
suggest that there is a significant loss of lifetime earnings for each year of schooling loss.  
Psacharopoulos (1985) estimated that the private returns to a year of primary schooling in 
                                                 
4 Evidence supporting that conjecture has been found by Akabuyashi and Psacharopoulos (1999).   
5 The actual rate for Ecuador is higher than that reported in table 4 because lag rates could not be estimated for 
Ecuadorian children over age 12. 
6 Psacharopoulos' (1997) analysis of data from Chile and Peru found that early entry into the labor market   
   led to two fewer years of schooling completed. 7 
Latin America averaged 61%, so even a few years of schooling sacrificed to gain current 
child earnings could lower lifetime earnings significantly. 
Tables 1 through 4 suggest a working hypothesis that while the majority of working 
children are enrolled in school, child labor hinders academic achievement per year spent in 
school.  Consequently, each year that a child avoids entering the labor market will result in 
some increased earnings as an adult, either because the child will make more rapid progress 
through school or because the child will complete more years of schooling.  This hypothesis 
will be tested rigorously in later chapters and found to be consistent with the data. 
Statistical Analysis 
The four household surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru support 
regression analyses of household decisions and child schooling outcomes.  The dependent 
variables in this analysis are measures of child labor, schooling, and educational attainment.  
Child labor is defined as child time spent on income-generating activities, whether in a 
family enterprise or in wage work for others.  Work that does not generate income, such as 
household chores, is not considered work by this definition.  Consequently, some forms of 
child labor, particularly forms that are most important for girls, are likely to be under-
reported. 
Child schooling is measured whether or not the child is currently enrolled in school.  
This does not capture intensity of schooling, as would a measure of schooling attendance.  
However, attained schooling, which is an outcome measure that should capture variation in 
the intensity of schooling, is reported in all data sets.  The measure of schooling attainment is 
based on the number of years a child lags behind the level that would represent normal 
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An IGFA of zero implies the child's attained years of schooling equal the expected level for 
the child's age. An IGFA score of 100 implies the child has never completed a year of 
schooling.   8 
The household-level variables, which will be used to explain the variation in the 
dependent variables, include the child's age and gender, number of members in the 
household, and number of children less than 5 years of age.  Parent information includes the 
age, gender, and educational attainment of the household head.  The remaining measures 
include a series of dummy variables indicating progressively higher income quintiles and a 
dummy variable indicating rural residence.  
A.  Econometric Determinants of Child Labor 
Probit regressions indicating how various factors affect the probability of child labor 
are reported in table 5.  For ease of interpretation, coefficients have been converted into 
derivatives of the probability of child labor with respect to the exogenous variables.  Two 
specifications, including and excluding the income quintiles, are reported for each country.  
Except for Brazil, the income quintiles add significantly to the explanatory power of the 
regressions, so discussion will concentrate on the fuller specifications.  The estimated effects 
are consistent across all four countries in both sign and magnitude.  Consequently, it appears 
that similar forces drive the decision to send children to work in all four countries.   
Child labor appears to respond to market opportunities.  As a child ages, the 
probability of working rises, consistent with the presumption of rising child wages with age.  
With the exception of the improbably large marginal effect at age 11 in Ecuador, the 
probability of child labor rises monotonically with age.  As children age from 10 to 14, the 
probability of working rises 14 to 24 percentage points depending on the country.  Child 
labor is significantly greater in rural areas where demand is greatest.  The rural-urban 
differential is only 6 percentage points in Nicaragua, but it is larger elsewhere.  Rural 
children are about 20% more likely to work than urban children in Brazil and Ecuador and 
34% more likely to work in Peru. 
Girls have a significantly lower probability of working for income than do boys; the 
effect varies from -8% in Peru to -16% in Ecuador.  Child labor is not particularly sensitive 
to the composition of the household or the attributes of the household head.  Only in Peru 
does the presence of young children in the household affect the probability of work for the 
older children; there, child labor probability rises 4 percentage points for every young child 
in the household.  The impact of overall household size is small in all countries and has 9 
consistent signs.  If one reason for child labor is that some children need to work to raise 
income sufficiently to allow their siblings to go to school, these results suggest that the 
impact is very small in all of these countries. 
The age and gender of the household head have no appreciable impact on the 
probability that children will work.  However, parental education has a strong negative effect 
on the probability that the children will work.  Parental education consistently lowers the 
probability of child labor in all countries.  For every year of parental schooling attainment, 
the probability of child labor falls 0.3 to 0.8 percentage points. 
The effect of poverty on the decision to work is explored through the use of income 
quintiles.
7  For each country, two regressions were run: one that includes quintile dummies 
and one that does not.  This is because income quintiles can be endogenous, in that they can 
be affected by the behavior being measured in the dependent variable (i.e., whether or not the 
household sends children to work).  If household income is endogenous, then the regression 
coefficients on the other regressors will be biased.  The use of quintiles rather than income 
levels mitigates the problem somewhat in that child labor may alter income insufficiently to 
cause quintiles to change.  A comparison of the estimated coefficients between regressions 
with and without quintiles reveals that if simultaneity bias exists, it is small. 
A positive relationship between child labor and poverty is confirmed in only Ecuador 
and Peru.  There, children in each progressively higher quintile have a lower probability of 
working.  The data for Brazil and Nicaragua reveal no particular pattern between household 
income level and child labor.  The implication from table 5 is that income transfers that raise 
household income may not alter child labor, although they may have the desired effect in 
Peru and Ecuador.  In all countries, however, income-earning opportunities for children 
corresponding to age, rural residence and gender appear to have a significant impact on child 
labor force participation.  Altering returns to child labor may have a larger effect. 
B. Economic  Determinants of School Enrollment 
Table 6 lists the results of enrollment regressions, with and without income quintiles.  
The null hypothesis that income quintiles do not affect enrollment probability is rejected in 10 
every country.  Coefficients are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the income quintiles, 
so we concentrate our discussion on the specifications including income quintiles. 
The results show that despite high enrollment rates in all four countries, there are 
clear associations between some of the explanatory variables and enrollment.  First, there is a 
monotonic decline in the propensity for enrollment with age.  For instance, 14-year-olds 
exhibit significantly lower enrollment in school compared to 10-year-olds.  Second, rural 
children show significantly lower enrollment than their urban counterparts by about 3% to 
11%.  Third, girls exhibit higher enrollment rates, but the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant only in Brazil and Nicaragua. 
All of these effects are opposite to their marginal effects on child labor: factors that 
tend to raise enrollment tended also to lower child labor.  Comparing coefficients in table 5 
with their counterparts in table 6, opposite signs are found in fourteen of fifteen cases in all 
four countries.  The cases in which signs were the same across the tables were those in which 
one or both coefficients were insignificantly different from zero.  It is apparent that school 
enrollment and child labor have opposite responses to household attributes and measures of 
child market opportunities. 
Household size has small effects of mixed signs.  Where significant, the presence of 
children under the age of 5 lowers enrollment probability by 1 to 2 percentage points, which 
suggests that older children are withheld from school to help raise their younger siblings.  
However, there is no strong evidence that larger families are less likely to send children to 
school, or alternatively, that some children are withheld so others can attend school. 
The age and gender of the household head have small effects of mixed signs.   
However, the education of the head has a consistently positive effect on child enrollment 
with that probability rising 0.2 to 1.6 percentage points per year of schooling attained.  An 
added year of parental education lowers child labor by roughly the same amount as it raises 
school enrollment. 
Measures of household income have much stronger effects on school enrollment than 
on child labor, although the effects may seem surprisingly small.  In Brazil, children in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 The inclusion of the head’s highest educational attainment in the regression is an excellent proxy for the 
permanent income of the household; thus, the income decile can be regarded as capturing more transitory spells 
or unpredicted income deviations.  11 
highest income quintile are only 4% more likely to enroll than are children in the lowest 
income quintile.  The comparable estimates are 8% and 12% in Ecuador and Nicaragua 
respectively.  In Peru, the effect is less than 2%. 
C. Economic  Determinants  of Lagging School Attainment 
Although child labor may not significantly lower enrollment, it may affect grade 
attainment through its effect on attendance. Table 7 provides the results of a regression for 
lagging behind in school, defined here as the difference between actual and optimal grade-
for-age.  The specifications mimic those above except that age is excluded because it is 
already incorporated into the dependent variable.  A general finding from a comparison of 
the signs and significance of the coefficients in tables 5 and 7 is that factors that raise the 
probability of child labor also cause a child to lag behind in school.
8  Therefore, the inverse 
relationship between allocating child time to work and a child's educational attainment is 
confirmed. 
Girls are less likely to lag behind in school than boys.  Rural children are more likely 
to lag behind than their urban counterparts.  These results are consistent with the impact of 
the variables on probability of child labor.  Household composition measures have consistent 
impacts on lagging behind.  Children in larger families and with siblings under 5 years of age 
significantly lag behind in all countries.  Parental attributes also matter.  Younger parents are 
more likely to have children who lag behind in schooling, as are less educated parents.   
Gender of the household head has inconsistent effects. 
The role of income is strong and consistent.  Children in the lowest quintiles lag 5% 
to 22% behind those in the highest quintile, depending on the country.  As children's 
positions in the income distribution improves, their probability of lagging in schooling 
attainment falls.  The impact of household income on probability of lagging in school is 
stronger than the income effect on either child labor or enrollment. 
To the extent that it is school attainment rather than enrollment that is important, the 
finding that child labor and attainment are inversely related further strengthens the notion 
that one can fight child labor through increased incentives to invest in schooling.  This 
                                                 
8 The one exception is that in Peru, household size has a negative and significant effect on child labor but a 
positive and significant effect on falling behind in school. 12 
explains the phenomenon that countries with relatively high child labor rates still can exhibit 
high enrollment rates (see figure 3) but with lower quality of actual attainment. 
D.  Direct Effect of Child Labor on Schooling Outcomes 
  While the results above are consistent with the presumption that child labor 
and schooling outcomes are inversely related, they do not prove that presumption.  This 
section reports on a direct test of that presumption by examining how exogenous increases in 
child labor supply associated with more lax compulsory schooling regulations across 
countries affect school enrollment and grade attainment of children in those countries. 
Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003) and Rosati and Rossi (2003) have shown that 
for the cases of Brazil, Pakistan and Nicaragua respectively, the decisions to attend school 
and to work are made under simultaneous conditions, with these decisions influenced by 
unobserved factors.  When modelled as a bivariate probit, the error terms of the schooling 
and employment equations are negatively correlated, suggesting that there is a tradeoff 
between the activities.   
However the correlation of unobservables from the two equations cautions one from 
measuring the direct effect of child employment on schooling outcomes since some portion 
of the relationship may be driven by outside factors.  We attempt to explore the effect of 
child labor on schooling outcomes after purging the “contaminated” correlation from a 
regression through the application of an instrumental variables technique.  That is, rather than 
use children’s actual employment status in the regression we will predict their employment 
using the exogenous variables in the schooling equation as well as instrumental variables that 
are correlated with employment but not with schooling.   
  In their paper, Angrist and Krueger (1991) recognized that individuals with late 
birthdays have an exogenous reason to remain in school according to US compulsory 
schooling laws.  Here the identification comes from cross-country variation in education 
policy; as reported by UNESCO (2002).  Countries differ in the official age for beginning 
first grade and in the age at which children can leave school legally.  These differences in 
compulsory schooling laws are exogenous to the household’s decision making process.  The 
official ages for beginning first grade vary from age 5 in Colombia; age 6 in Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, 13 
Venezuela; and age 7 in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.   The 
corresponding ages for terminating compulsory schooling are age 12 in Nicaragua and 
Honduras; age 13 in Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay; age 14 in Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay; age 15 in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Venezuela; and age 16 in Peru. 
We can illustrate that these legislative restrictions on truancy are indeed correlated 
with child time use.  Figure 4 plots the average years of schooling attainment for youth ages 
16-18 in the countries examined above.   The countries that have late official ages of entering 
first grade, as reported by UNESCO (2002), are clustered at the lowest end of performance, 
while countries that officially start first grade at earlier ages have better average attainments 
for 16-18 year olds youths.  For example, schooling attainment for youth in Brazil is under 7 
years while peers in Ecuador, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru have attained over 8 years of 
schooling.  A similar pattern exists among older generations of adults, implying that 
education policies permitting or promoting late entry to school have costly and non-
reversible long run-effects.  
We combine the information on legal school starting and leaving ages with household 
survey data circa 2000 for all 16 countries for children ages 10-16.  Table 8 shows the results 
from a two-stage least squares regression model.  The first two columns show the model for 
school attendance in which the exogenous variables include the child’s age, sex, region of 
residence (urban or rural),number of children in the household younger than age 6, total 
household size, age and schooling of the household head and whether the household is 
headed by a female.   
The instruments for child work include both schooling policy variables – the age at 
which first grade begins and the modal age at which compulsory schooling is designed to 
end.  The child's age is also interacted with the policy variables.  Since the individual level 
observations do not vary across the policy level variables we have controlled for 
heteroskedasticity by estimating Huber-White standard errors. 
After controlling for other family characteristics as well as country dummies, children 
who work are significantly less likely to attend school than their peers.  Reducing the 
probability of working by 10% results in an increase in the probability of attending school by 14 
7%.  Child labor also has a cost in terms of lost attained schooling.  The fourth and fifth 
columns of Table 8 present a two-stage least squares regression in which the dependent 
variable is being at least 2 years behind the appropriate grade for age in school.  Controlling 
for endogeneity, children who work are significantly more likely to lag in school than their 
peers.  Reducing the probability of working by 10% reduces the probability of lagging 
behind in school by 12%.  The identification from the policy level variables suggest child 
labor is not only a symptom of unobserved stresses on the family but a direct negative 
influence on schooling outcomes in and of itself.  
Policy Implications 
In some Latin American countries, household income does not have a strong effect on 
child labor because as incomes rise, child labor becomes less sensitive to further increases in 
income.  Thus, it is doubtful that child labor can be eliminated solely by increases in income.  
Policies may need to address other factors that influence the incidence of child labor, 
particularly the strength of demand for child workers. 
Two findings from the empirical work merit additional emphasis.  Past research has 
not been able to answer whether child labor just discourages enrollment or if child labor 
discourages both enrollment and school attainment.  This distinction is not trivial because the 
policy tools involved in increasing enrollment (say, by increasing access to schools) are 
different from those that improve school attainment (say, by increasing enforcement of 
truancy laws or improving school quality).  The findings clearly indicate that child labor 
reduces both school enrollment and educational attainment in Latin America.  Factors that 
raise the probability of child labor consistently lower school enrollment and grade-for-age.  
Furthermore, exogenous increases in child labor lower school attendance and increase the 
probability of lagging behind grade level.  Thus, policy efforts geared toward increasing 
enrollment are not enough.  Policy makers in Latin America need to explore how children 
can be induced to attend school more regularly, as well. 
The findings demonstrate  that choices regarding child labor and education are 
intimately related with each other and with household attributes.  These choices are 
particularly sensitive to factors affecting the child's market opportunities and the household's 15 
income level.  Policies that do not affect both household income and the value of a child's 
time in school relative to work, may fail to address the problem. 
Interventions that address child labor and low educational attainment such as the new 
breed of targeted conditional transfer programs for human development (such as 
PROGRESA in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil) may offer the right solution.  First, these 
programs target poor families with children.  Second, they make cash transfers to the 
beneficiaries on the condition that their children regularly attend school, raising the returns of 
child time in school relative to the values of child time in the labor force.  While these 
programs do not explicitly require or monitor a reduction in child labor, their critical design 
feature (i.e., children attend school up to a minimum number of days) is likely to be effective 
in both lowering child labor and increasing school attendance.  These conjectures are tested 
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Figure 1: Employment and Enrollment Rates for Children Aged 10 to 14 
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Figure 3:  Average Enrollment Rates in 18 Latin American Countries  
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  Figure 4.  Average Years of Completed Schooling for 16-18 Year Olds
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Table 1:  Employment Rates for Children Aged 10 to 14, by Country, Urban or Rural Residence, and Gender. 
 Urban    Rural    Total 
 Brazil  Ecuador  Nicaragua  Peru    Brazil  Ecuador  Nicaraqua Peru    Brazil  Ecuador Nicaraqua  Peru 
Total 8%  22%  6%  13%    32%  36%  16%  51%    14%  36%  11%  29% 
Boys 11%  25%  8%  14%   44%  44%  27%  59%    19%  44%  17%  33% 
Girls 5%  18%  5%  12%    20%  28%  6%  44%    9%  28%  5%  26% 











Table 2:  Employment and Enrollment Rates for Children Aged 10 to 14, by Country and 
Labor Market Status. 
  Brazil Ecuador  Nicaragua Peru 
Employment Rate  14% 36%  11% 29% 
       
Enrollment Rate  91% 81%  81% 95% 
    Not Employed  93% 93%  85% 97% 
    Employed  79% 75%  56% 92% 
       
Data Sources:  Brazil, PNAD 1996; Ecuador, LSMS 1995; Nicaragua, LSMS 1998; Peru, LSMS 1997. 
 




Table 3:  Distribution of Daily Hours Worked By Children Aged 10 to 14, by Country and Gender. 
  Brazil    Ecuador   Nicaragua   Peru 
  Boys   Girls  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls  Total 
Under 5 Hours  51%  51%  51%  63%  70%  66%  39%  62%  44%  83%  87%  85% 
5-10 Hours  43%  43%  43%  36%  25%  31%  50%  28%  45%  15%  11%  13% 
Over 10 Hours  6%  6%  6%  1%  5%  3%   11%    10%    11%   2%  2%  2% 
Data Sources:  Brazil, PNAD 1996; Ecuador, LSMS 1995; Nicaragua, LSMS 1998; Peru, LSMS 1997. 
 





Table 4:  Percentage of Children Aged 10 to 14 Lagging Behind Expected Grade Level, by Country, Gender, and Labor Market Status. 
 Total    Boys    Girls 
 Brazil  Ecuador
a Nicaragua Peru   Brazil Ecuador
a Nicaragua Peru  Brazil Ecuador
a Nicaragua Peru 
School Only  42%  47%  35%  28%  45%  49%  38%  28%  40%  45%  32%  29% 
School & Work  54%  55%  45%  36%  54%  55%  38%  49%  55%  38%  34% 
Work Only  69%  54%  79%  43%  73%  50%  81%  42%  61%  62%  64%  45% 
Total  46%  56%  42%  31%  50%  59%  46%  31%  43%  54%  38%  30% 
aNote that Ecuadorian children aged 13 to 14 years are excluded due to a lack of data on the highest grade for those children. 
Data Sources:  Brazil, PNAD 1996; Ecuador, LSMS 1995; Nicaragua, LSMS 1998; Peru, LSMS 1997.   25
 
Table 5:  Econometric Determinants of Child Labor. 
  Brazil Ecuador  Nicaragua Peru 
Age=11
1  0.041**  0.041**  0.616** 0.586* 0.084**  0.082**  0.022  0.018 
Age=12
1  0.091** 0.091** 0.124** 0.118** 0.076** 0.077**  0.039  0.039 
Age=13
1  0.139** 0.139** 0.254** 0.246** 0.135** 0.134** 0.131** 0.127** 
Age=14
1  0.209** 0.208** 0.238** 0.228** 0.154** 0.154** 0.143** 0.139** 
Female  -0.089** -0.089** -0.164** -0.161** -0.103** -0.102** -0.081** -0.079** 
Rural  0.191** 0.192** 0.206** 0.266** 0.060** 0.064** 0.342** 0.344** 
Number of Children Under 5  0.002  0.002  -0.021  -0.013  0.002  0.003  0.038**  0.045** 
Household  Size  0.005** 0.005** 0.011** 0.022**  0.001  0.001  -0.021**  -0.015** 
Household  Head's  Age  -0.001** -0.001** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.003** -0.003** 
Household Head is Female  0.002  0.003  -0.016  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  0.023  0.023 
Household Head's Highest Education  -0.008**  -0.009**  -0.003  -0.006  -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.011** 
Quintile 2
2  -0.004   -0.062**   0.013   -0.061**  
Quintile 3
2  0.002   -0.127**   -0.015   -0.069**  
Quintile 4
2  -0.006   -0.138**   -0.022   -0.147**  
Quintile 5
2  -0.002   -0.211**   0.007   -0.115**  
Observations  37,343  37,343  2,831  2,831  3,114       3,114  2,341       2,341 
LR Chi2(15):  5283  5281  467  418  274        267  516        488 
Predicted Probability.  0.096  0.096  0.324 0.326 0.081 0.082 0.253 0.256 
Notes:  
1 Age=10 is the reference dummy. 
2 Bottom quintile is the reference dummy. 
Data Sources: Brazil, PNAD 1996; Ecuador, LSMS 1995, Nicaragua, LSMS 1998; Peru, LSMS 1997. 
All coefficients have been transformed into marginal probabilities associated with the variable. 
* Significant at the .10 level.  **Significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 6:  Econometric Determinants of Current Enrollment. 
 Brazil  Ecuador  Nicaragua  Peru 
Age=11
1  -0.011**  -0.011**  -0.039*  -0.040 -0.010 -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 
Age=12
1  -0.021** -0.021** -0.118** -0.124** -0.061** -0.056**  -0.009  -0.009 
Age=13
1  -0.050** -0.050** -0.279** -0.278**  -0.021  -0.015  -0.052** -0.052** 
Age=14
1  -0.109** -0.108** -0.362** -0.359** -0.110** -0.105** -0.085** -0.083** 
Female 0.011**  0.012**  0.0005  0.002  0.034**  0.040**  -0.005  -0.005 
Rural  -0.048** -0.057** -0.063** -0.113** -0.025** -0.060** -0.032** -0.034** 
Number of Children Under 5  -0.013**  -0.015**  0.001  -0.002  -0.017**  -0.025**  -0.003  -0.004 
Household  Size  -0.001**  -0.002** -0.002 -0.010**  0.008**  0.003  0.001  -0.0002 
Household  Head's  Age  0.0003**  0.0005**  0.001* 0.001* 0.0004 0.001* -0.0004  -0.0003 
Household Head is Female  -0.026**  -0.031**  -0.001  -0.010  0.034**  0.032**  -0.011  -0.011 
Household Head's Highest Education  0.009**  0.011**  0.005*  0.007**  0.016**  0.022**  0.002*  0.003** 
Quintile 2
2  0.014**  0.031**  0.064**  0.014**  
Quintile 3
2  0.023**  0.053**  0.091**  0.018**  
Quintile 4
2  0.035**  0.082**  0.105**  0.027**  
Quintile 5
2  0.042**  0.080**  0.119**   0.018   
Observations  37,334  37,344  2,831 2,831 3,107 3,107 2,341 2,341 
LR  Chi2(15):  2833  2716  494 411 432 335 105  95 
Predicted  Probability.  0.938 0.936 0.937 0.927 0.901 0.890 0.969 0.967 
Notes:  
1 Age=10 is the reference dummy 
2 Bottom quintile is the reference dummy. 
Data Sources:  Brazil, PNAD 1996; Ecuador, LSMS 1995, Nicaragua, LSMS 1998; Peru, LSMS 1997. 
All coefficients have been transformed into marginal probabilities associated with the variable. 
* Significant at the .10 level. .  **Significant at the .05 level.    27
 
 
Table 7:  Econometric Determinants of Falling Behind in School. 
 Brazil  Ecuador  Nicaragua  Peru 
Female  -6.811**  -6.822** -2.290  -2.348 -6.955**  -7.460** -0.823  -0.784 
Rural 7.102**  10.902** 0.311  3.647**  7.344**  10.929** 5.951**  6.171** 
Number of Children Under 5  2.042**  2.993**  1.823*  0.773*  1.715**  2.670**  1.643**  1.948** 
Household  Size  1.570** 2.167**  0.124  2.294** 0.733** 1.316** 0.843** 1.098** 
Household  Head's  Age  -0.055** -0.119**  0.099  0.089  -0.272** -0.330** -0.127** -0.152** 
Household Head is Female  4.278**  6.051**  -2.500 -1.781  -2.607**  -2.297* 0.245  0.331 
Household Head's Highest Education  -1.623**  -2.383**  -0.112  -0.346  -2.442** -3.024** -1.216** -1.378** 
Quintile 2  -10.760**   -4.286*    -13.225**  -2.950**  
Quintile 3  -16.125**   -8.090**   -16.014**  -4.650**  
Quintile 4  -18.813**   -10.378**   -17.735**  -6.183**  
Quintile 5  -18.877**   -11.572**   -21.988**  -5.235**  
          
Observations  37,315  37,315  1,602 1,602 3,105 3,105 2,316 2,316 
F  1745  2209 6  6  108  146 40  59 
Root  MSE  23.5 24.3 28.6 28.7 30.1 30.7 20.7 20.8 
Notes:  
1 Age=10 is the reference dummy 
2 Bottom quintile is the reference dummy. 
Data Sources: Brazil, PNAD 1996; Ecuador, LSMS 1995, Nicaragua, LSMS 1998; Peru, LSMS 1997 
Note: Ecuadorian children aged 13 to 14 years are excluded due to a lack of data on the highest grade for those children. 
All coefficients have been transformed into marginal probabilities associated with the variable. 
* Significant at the .10 level.  **Significant at the .05 level.  
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Table 8.  Effect of Child Work on School Outcomes 
 
      
Model:  Two Stage Least Squares   
with Huber-White Standard Errors 
         
         
Dependent Var.:  School Attendance  Dependent Var.:  Lagging In Sch 
            
 Coef.   Std.Err. Coef.    Std.Err.
            
constant 1.291 *  0.051 0.704  *  0.060
child work (instrumented)
1 -0.733 **  0.351 1.231  *  0.210
child's age  -0.017 **  0.008 0.008    0.007
female child  -0.061 ***  0.032 0.061  **  0.028
rural 0.014   0.017 -0.024    0.048
num. kids < age 6  -0.023 *  0.007 0.017  *  0.005
total persons in hh  0.002   0.002 0.011  *  0.002
age of hh head  0.001   0.000 -0.001  **  0.000
female head  -0.010 **  0.005 0.025  ***  0.014
schooling of head  0.006 *  0.002 -0.012  *  0.002
15 country dummies             included (not shown)  included (not shown) 
            
        
No. obs.  186,735     186,753    
No. countries  16     16    
Adj R-sq. 
2 0.169     0.188    
            
1  Instruments include:  the schooling policy variables (age at which first grade begins and modal age at which 
compulsory schooling ends), the child's age, sex, region of residence (urban or rural), age, sex and schooling of 
the household head.  The child's age is also interacted with the policy variables.   
           
2  Does not includes share explained by country dummies. 
           
* Significant at .01 level.           
** Significant at .05 level.           
*** Significant at .10 level.           